Permission parity
Airtable permissions are coarse and often supplemented by convention. A migration that reproduces the convention as policy is a security improvement; one that grants blanket access is a breach waiting to be found.
This is a generalised method, not a client case study. No client names, schemas, data, or outcomes are published here, and no results are claimed on a client's behalf.
What is permission parity when migrating off Airtable?
Airtable permissions are coarse and often supplemented by convention. A migration that reproduces the convention as policy is a security improvement; one that grants blanket access is a breach waiting to be found.
Method
- Export the collaborator list per base and per interface, including external and read-only collaborators.
- Write down the implicit rules too: the view someone was told not to open is a permission requirement.
- Model roles in a dedicated roles table, never as a column on the user or profile record.
- Enable row-level security on every table and write policies per role, granting only what a policy allows.
- Diff effective access per person before and after, and require sign-off on any widening.
-- for each person, what can they read after migration?
select u.email, t.table_name, has_table_privilege(u.db_role, t.table_name, 'SELECT') as can_read
from migrated_users u cross join migration_tables t
order by u.email, t.table_name;Failure modes
- Granting broad table access because RLS policies are not written yet.
- Forgetting field-level restrictions that Airtable enforced through hidden fields in a view.
- Service accounts that bypass RLS being used for ordinary reads.
How it is verified
- Per-person access diff shows no unintended widening.
- A test user in each role is denied everything outside their policy set.
Questions this pattern answers
What is permission parity when migrating off Airtable?
Airtable permissions are coarse and often supplemented by convention. A migration that reproduces the convention as policy is a security improvement; one that grants blanket access is a breach waiting to be found.
How do you implement permission parity?
Export the collaborator list per base and per interface, including external and read-only collaborators. Write down the implicit rules too: the view someone was told not to open is a permission requirement. Model roles in a dedicated roles table, never as a column on the user or profile record. Enable row-level security on every table and write policies per role, granting only what a policy allows. Diff effective access per person before and after, and require sign-off on any widening.
How is permission parity verified?
Per-person access diff shows no unintended widening. A test user in each role is denied everything outside their policy set.
What usually goes wrong with permission parity?
Granting broad table access because RLS policies are not written yet. Forgetting field-level restrictions that Airtable enforced through hidden fields in a view. Service accounts that bypass RLS being used for ordinary reads.
Related patterns
Dependency inventory before an Airtable exit →
Find everything pointed at the base first.
Preserving linked records →
Relations survive the move or the move failed.
Automation and script mapping →
Every automation gets a named destination.
Reconciliation before cutover →
Prove the copy matches before you trust it.
Projects in this track
This page documents the method. Engagement scope and pricing live on TechTide AI.
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